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INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION

Under traditional monopoly regimes in the United States,
States, the
requirements
on
of
regulatory
requirements
imposed
combination
telecommunications carriers enabled
development and
telecommunications
enabled the development
telecommunications infrastructure
infrastructure that was widely
sustainability of telecommunications
available, affordable and reliable. With the transition from monopoly
competitive regimes, some regulatory requirements within the
to competitive
industry-specific telecommunications
telecommunications regime
regime had to be modified to
industry-specific
example, universal
universal
continue pursuit of underlying policy goals. For example,
service policy was modified
modified in the Telecommunications
Telecommunications Act of 1996
to shift reliance from implicit subsidies within the rate structure to a
rebalancing.1I
mechanisms and
and rate
rate rebalancing.
combination of explicit funding mechanisms
However, explicit funding mechanisms have presented their own
sustainability problems.22
sustainability
deregulatory telecommunications
telecommunications policies are also shifting
Further deregulatory
the boundaries
boundaries between the traditional
industry-specific (common
traditional industry-specific
carriage/publicutility)
utility) and
and general
generalbusiness legal regimes,
regimes, but in illcarriage/public
defined ways and with considerable conflict
conflict in interpretation
interpretation among
3
considerable disagreement
disagreement and
exemplified by considerable
and
the courts. This is exemplified
uncertainty
related
to
judicial
interpretation
of
the
preexisting
savings
uncertainty
interpretation
*• Professor,
Professor, Department
Department of
of Telecommunications,
Telecommunications, Indiana
Indiana University.
University.
1. Barbara A. Cherry &
Universal Service Policy
Policy in the
I.
& Steven S. Wildman,
Wildman, Review of Federal
Federal Universal
United
States, in MAKING
United States.
MAKING UNIVERSAL SERVICE POLICY: ENHANCING
ENHANCING THE PROCESS THROUGH
MULTIDISCIPLINARY EVALUATION 167,
(B. Cherry, A. Hammond
& S. Wildman, eds., 1999).
MULTIDISCIPLINARY
167, 167-69
167-{i9 (8.
Hammond &
1999).
Future: How Transportation
Transportation Deregulatory
Deregulatory Policies
Policies
2. See Barbara A. Cherry, Back to the Future:
Foreshadow Evolution of Communications
Policies, 24 THE
INFORMATION SOCIETY
Foreshadow
Communications Policies.
THE INFORMATION
SOCIETY 273, 283
(2008).
Consumer Sovereignty:
Sovereignty: Redrawing
BoundariesBetween Industry-Specific
Industry-Specific
3. Barbara A. Cherry, Consumer
Redrawing the Boundaries
and General
Telecommunications and
and Broadband
BroadbandAccess Service 13-31,
13-31,
and
General Business Legal Regimes for
for Telecommunications
Telecommunications Policy Research
Paper presented at the 35th Telecommunications
Research Conference
Conference (TPRC 2007), Arlington,
VA (2007).
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clause in section 414 of the Communications
Communications Act of 1934 as well as
interpretation of the new antitrust-specific
antitrust-specific savings clause in section
interpretation
Telecommunications Act of 1996, the FCC's Truth-in601(b) of the Telecommunications
Billing rules and its savings clause, and the savings clause
clause for state
regulation
332(c)(3)(A) related to CMRS services.44
section 332(c)(3)(A)
regulation in section
classification of broadband access
Perhaps most notable is the FCC's classification
access
Cable Modem Declaratory
Declaratory
services as information services
services in its Cable
6
5
Ruling
Order, and thereby not
Rulini and Wireline Broadband
Broadband Access Order,
subject to common carriage regulation under Title II of the
triggered
Communications Act of 1934. These FCC orders have triggered
important
debate regarding
regarding
important issues collectively
collectively referred to as network
77
neutrality.
neutrality.
I have previously
mischaracterizations of the law of
of
previously asserted that mischaracterizations
common carriage and its relationship to other bodies of law have
constructive discourse of
of8
created a foundational
foundational problem for constructive
general
in
technologies
communications
for
policies
deregulatory
communications technologies in general 8
and for network neutrality in particular. 9 The mischaracterizations
mischaracterizations lie
description of the
inadequately understood and misrepresented
misrepresented description
in an inadequately
lineage of legal principles that evolved in the United States to address
specifically, the
differing forms of access problems. 1100 More specifically,
mischaracterizations
arise
because
the
statutory
regime-instead
of
mischaracterizations
because
regime-instead of
the common law-is misidentified as the original
original regulatory regime
11
mischaracterizations have led "to
of common
common carriage. II Such mischaracterizations
"to a
conflation of the legal bases for addressing
addressing access problems
problems for end
4. See id.
id.
at 13-29.
5. See generally
generally Inquiry Concerning
Concerning High-Speed
High-Speed Access to the Internet
Internet Over Cable and Other
Facilities; Internet
Internet Over Cable
Cable Declaratory Ruling; Appropriate Regulatory
Regulatory Treatment
Treatment for Broadband
[hereinafter Cable Modem
Access to the Internet
Internet Over Cable Facilities, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4802 (2002)
(2002) [hereinafter
Declaratory Ruling].
6. See generally
generally In the Matter of Appropriate
Appropriate Framework
Framework for Broadband
Broadband Access
Access to the Internet
Internet
14,853,
Over Wireline Facilities, Universal
Universal Service
Service Obligations of Broadband Providers, 20 F.C.C.R. 14,853,
(2005) [hereinafter Wireline Broadband
Order].
14,858 (2005)
Broadband Access Order].
7. Barbara
Eliminate Common Carriage
Threatens Free
Free
Barbara A. Cherry, Misusing
Misusing Network Neutrality
Neutrality to Eliminate
Carriage Threatens
Speech and the Postal
KY. L. REV.
501 (2006).
REv. 483, SOl
Postal System, 33 N. Ky.
Cherry, supra
supranote 2, at 277-281.
8. See Cherry,
277-281.
9. See Cherry,
Cherry, supra
supranote 7, at 500-03.
10. Id.at
[d. at 500.
11.
II. Id.at50l.
[d. at 501.
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customers and competitors. As a result, there
there is a preoccupation
preoccupation
user customers
relationship,
the
provider-to-provider
and
regulation of the provider-to-provider relationship, and
with regulation
unsubstantiated reliance
reliance on antitrust principles
principles to address provider-toprovider-tounsubstantiated
customer access
access problems."'
problems.,,122 Furthermore,
Furthermore, such preoccupation
preoccupation with
customer
provider-to-provider relationship,
relationship, or wholesale
wholesale market, and
and
the provider-to-provider
consider
to
failure
an
analytical
of
is
symptomatic
theory
symptomatic of
analytical
consider
antitrust theory
policy sustainability. 1\33 Yet, based on a historical
critical issues of policy
critical
analysis
the evolution
evolution of
of legal rules
rules and the effects
effects on network
network
analysis of the
infrastructures
infrastructures in the United States, II have asserted that the
deregulatory telecommunications
telecommunications policies will likely
likely
sustainability of deregulatory
sustainability
of
principles
law
common
require retention
elements of the
common
principles
of
retention of elements
4
utilities.
public
and
common carriage
carriage
public utilities. 14
common
This article builds on this prior work, utilizing a complexity
complexity theory
perspective for both framing the inquiry
inquiry and guiding
guiding analysis, to
perspective
examine the fundamental
fundamental question
question as to what legal rules are
examine
communications
necessary
necessary for the sustainability
sustainability of critical communications
desired emergent properties
infrastructures
properties of
of
infrastructures that generate
generate the desired
widespread
widespread availability,
availability, affordability
affordability and reliability.
reliability. This paper
paper
economy requires an institutional
asserts that, just as a market economy
infrastructure
infrastructure to sustain it, critical network infrastructures with
desired
desired emergent properties require specific legal rules for their
sustainability. Historically
Historically in the United States, infrastructures
infrastructures
providing varying types of essential
essential services,
services, such as transportation
transportation
and communications,
communications, were governed by principles
principles embedded
embedded in
common
common carriage and public utilities. These legal principles were left
left
transportation,'IS5 but have been
deregulatory policies for transportation,
intact under deregulatory
eliminated for broadband
broadband by the recent FCC rulings that triggered the
eliminated
network neutrality
neutrality debate.'
debate. 166 Thus, this article asserts that, properly
properly
is
States
is
framed, the network neutrality debate in the United
symptomatic of the need for a deeper inquiry as to the critical legal
symptomatic
Id. at
at 500.
500.
12. Id.
Id. at 503.
503.
13. Id.
\3.
Id. at 504.
504.
14. Id.
14.
278-281.
supra note 2, at 278-28l.
15. See Cherry, supra
IS.
supra note 5; Wireline Broadband Access Order,
Declaratory Ruling, supra
See, e.g., Cable Modem Declaratory
16. See,
supranote 6.
supra
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communications infrastructures
infrastructures with
rules necessary for sustainable communications
certain desired properties.
In search of identifying such critical legal rules, analysis starts with
examination of policy developments in the United States. It stresses
examination
historically accurate understanding
understanding of legal developments
developments in
that a historically
of
the United States reveals the importance of common law principles of
law-which include imposition of
of
common carriage and public utility law-which
ex ante requirements
requirements on providers
in
the
retail
market-in
providers
generating
the desired emergent properties of widely available, affordable and
telecommunications infrastructures. It also
reliable transportation and telecommunications
shows how recent FCC policy decisions affecting broadband
broadband access
services, whereby common carriage obligations are not imposed in
either the wholesale or retail markets, is a radical
radicaldeparture from the
deregulatory
deregulatory policies that have been adopted
adopted for transportation
transportation as
well as
narrowband
narrowband telecommunications
telecommunications networks. It is the
elimination of the common law scaffolding
scaffolding for application
elimination
application to
broadband
infrastructure
that
has
triggered
the
current
network
broadband infrastructure
neutrality
neutrality debate; yet, at the same time, it is the misleading
misleading discourse
significance of the
of network neutrality that not only masks the significance
inapplicability
inapplicability of the common
common law principles
principles in the retail broadband
broadband
market but also blocks
inquiry
into
the
legal
rules
in
the
retail
market
blocks inquiry
legal
market
that may be necessary
necessary for the desired
desired network
network properties
properties to emerge.
This article also incorporates
incorporates prior
prior research stressing
stressing the
importance
of
liability
liability rules on economic incentives
incentives to invest
invest in
importance
performance,
such
as
network
reliability,
of
communications
communications
performance,
network
17 In
systems. 17
telecommunications
In this respect, liability rules for telecommunications
carriers
evolved along a unique trajectory,
carriers in the United States
States evolved
carriers.' 8
all other
that of
from
ways
substantial
in
differing
of all
other common
common carriers.18
differing substantial ways from that
17.
17. See
See generally
generally Barbara A. Cherry,
Cherry, Improving Network Reliability-Liability
Reliability-Liability Rules Must
Must
Recognize
Recognize Investor
Investor Risk/Reward
Risk/Reward Strategies,
Strategies, in RETHINKING
RETHINKING RIGHTS
RIGHTS AND
AND REGULATIONS:
REGULATIONS: INSTITUTIONAL
INSTITIITIONAL
RESPONSES
309, 309-33
TO NEW
NEW COMMUNICATION
COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES
TECHNOLOGIES 309,
309-33 (Lorrie
(Lorrie Faith
Faith Cranor
Cranor &
& Steven
Steven S.
S.
RESPONSES TO
Wildman
Wildman eds.,
eds., 2003)
2003) [hereinafter
[hereinafter Improving
Improving Network
Network Reliability].
Reliability]. See
See also
also BARBARA
BARBARA A.
A. CHERRY,
CHERRY, THE
THE
CRISIS
CRISIS IN
IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS
TELECOMMUNICATIONS CARRIER
CARRIER LIABILITY: HISTORICAL
HISTORICAL REGULATORY
REGULATORY FLAWS
FLAWS AND
AND
RECOMMENCED
CARRIER LIABILITY].
RECOMMENCED REFORM
REFORM (1999) [hereinafter
[hereinafter CRISIS
CRISIS IN
IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS
TELECOMMUNICATIONS CARRIER
LIABILITY].
18. See
18.
See Improving
Improving Network
Network Reliability,
Reliability, supra
supra note
note 17, at
at 311-14; CRISIS
CRISIS IN
IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
CARRIER
CARRIER LIABILITY,
LIABILITY, supra
supra note
note 17, at
at 14-28.

(1999)

17, 14-28.

17, 311-14;
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As a result, under deregulatory
deregulatory policies, the shift in the liability
regime for telecommunications
telecommunications carriers is also unique, posing
potential liability for catastrophic
catastrophic losses (previously capped under
tariffs) and threatening the long-term
long-term sustainability, reliability, and
19 Although
ubiquity of communications infrastructures.
infrastructures. 19
Although the need for
unique liability rules for technologies of high-risk high-reliability
contexts-such as
organizations has been acknowledged
acknowledged in other contexts-such
nuclear power plants-it has thus far been inadequately
inadequately considered
considered
by policy making bodies in the United States for application
application to
communication
communication networks.22o°
This article
article concludes that further research is vital for improving
our understanding
understanding of those critical legal rules necessary
necessary for the
sustainability of communications
communications network infrastructures
infrastructures with the
widespread availability, affordability
affordability
desired emergent properties
properties of widespread
and reliability. As research progresses, we may better understand
understand
how the U.S. common law principles
common carriers and public
principles of common
utilities, which historically
addressed
certain
demand-side
historically
certain forms of demand-side
failures, were an important means of fulfilling this function.
Furthermore,
deregulatory policies, but
Furthermore, their elimination
elimination through deregulatory
without replacement by some other legal rules to fulfill a similar
function, may render unsustainable the development of critical
communications
communications infrastructures with the desired emergent
emergent properties.
FRAMING INQuIRY
INQUIRY FROM A COMPLEXITY
COMPLEXITY THEORY PERSPECTIVE
I. FRAMING
PERSPECTNE

Changes
communications technologies and servicesservicesChanges in communications
particularly
particularly with development
development of digital technology
technology and the
Internet-coupled with the transition from monopoly to competitive
Intemet---coupled
competitive
regulatory regimes have created a fundamental
fundamental shift in their
21
governability.
govemability?1
This reality undermines the appropriateness
appropriateness of the
19. See Improving
Improving Network Reliability,
supra note 17,
Reliability, supra
17, at 317-24.
317-24.
id. at 318-21; CISIS
INTELECOMMUNICATIONS CARRIER
supra note 17, at 606020. See id
CRISIS IN
CARRIER LIABILITY,
LIABILITY, supra
66.
21. Barbara A. Cherry, The Telecommunications
Telecommunications Economy and
and Regulation
as Coevolving Complex
Complex
21.
Regulation as
Adaptive Systems: Implications
(hereinafter
COMM. L. J. 369,
369, 373-74 (2007) [hereinafter
Implications for Federalism,
Federalism, 59 FED. COMM.
The Telecommunications
Telecommunications Economy];
Economy]; Barbara A. Cherry &
& Johannes M. Bauer, Adaptive Regulation:
Regulation:
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traditional policy
policy analysis paradigm,
paradigm, based
based on
on optimizing some
measure of
of societal preferences
preferences reflected in an
an objective function.
paradigm of
of policy analysis must be developed
developed that
that
Instead, a new paradigm
need for,
for, and difficulties of,
of, designing
expressly recognizes the need
telecommunications policies.
sustainable telecommunications
In seeking a new paradigm, Bauer and I assert that a complexity
theory perspective facilitates our ability to appreciate the difficulties
of designing sustainable telecommunications policies for regulatory
regimes based on competition rather than monopoly.22
monopoly.22 "[I]f the
telecommunications sector and the legaUpolicymaking
legal/policymaking institutions are
telecommunications
viewed as coevolving and complex adaptive systems, then there are
policy."23 Implications
Implications include
important implications for regulatory policy.,,23
a greater appreciation of the diminishing capacity to achieve
specifically desired outcomes, and the unpredictability
specifically
unpredictability of efforts to
24 "Instead,
influence trajectories
trajectories of economic sector performance.
performance. 24
greater focus must be placed on how to design policies and
policymaking processes that are more suitable for interacting
interacting with,
policymaking
interpreting, and responding
to
the
telecommunications
responding
telecommunications sector over
time.,,25
time. 25
Complexity
Complex systems are nonlinear, dynamic systems. Complexity
theory refers
refers to the component
component areas of study that address distinctive
properties
of
properties complex
complex systems:
These
These properties
properties include:
include: catastrophes
catastrophes resulting from
discontinuity
in sudden
discontinuity in
sudden jumps
jumps in behavior,
behavior, chaos resulting
resulting from
unstable
aperiodic
behavior
unstable aperiodic behavior and
and sensitivity
sensitivity to initial conditions;
conditions;
uncomputability
because
system
output
transcends
uncomputability because system output transcends rules;
irreducibility
irreducibility because
because system behavior
behavior can not be understood
understood by
by
Contours
Contours of
of a
a Policy
Policy Model
Model for
for the
the Internet
Internet Economy
Economy 5,
5, Paper
Paper presented
presented at
at the ITS Fifteenth
Fifteenth Biennial
Biennial
Conference,
Conference, Berlin,
Berlin, Germany
Germany (2004)
(2004) (on
(on file
file with
with Georgia
Georgia State
State University
University Law Review).
22.
22. The
The Telecommunications
Telecommunications Economy,
Economy, supra
supra note
note 21,
21, at
at 371.
371. Sustainable
Sustainable policies
policies are defined
defined "as
"as
rules
rules that
that are
are politically
politically adoptable
adoptable and
and for
for which
which the
the desired
desired policy
policy goals
goals are
are reasonably
reasonably likely
likely to be
be
achievable."
Adaptive Regulation,
Regulation. supra
supra note
note 21,
21, at 5 (emphasis
(emphasis omitted).
omitted).
achievable." Adaptive
23.
23. The
The Telecommunications
Telecommunications Economy,
Economy, supra
supra note
note 21,
21, at
at 371.
371.
24.
24. Id.
Id. at371-72.
at 371-72.
25.
25. Id.
Id. at
at 372.
372.
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decomposing the system into parts; and emergence of order that
decomposing
spontaneously develops as collective
collective properties
spontaneously
properties from interacting
By contrast, simple systems are
system components.
characterized
by
predictable
characterized
predictable behavior, few interactions
interactions and
feedback/feedforward loops, centralized
centralized decision making, and
feedbacklfeedforward
reducibility.26
reducibility.26
Complex systems have rules,
rules, or limitations, that govern their
27 Furthermore,
behavior to keep the systems from becoming chaotic. 27
in complex adaptive systems (CAS), system feedback enables the
system to learn
experience and to adapt to changes
changes in the
learn from experience
28
28
system's environment. In this way, a CAS can actually change its
own rules.
Complexity theory enables us to perceive
perceive behavior of social
systems from a different frame of reference. In so doing, it provides
new ways of interpreting phenomenon
phenomenon and framing questions for
29
29
research.
research.
A. Importance
Sustainabilityof
of
Importance of Legal Infrastructure
Infrastructure for
for Sustainability
Economic Activities Generally
Generally
characterized by global structure
"Complex systems are characterized
structure and local
randomness. The global structure maintains the strength
strength of the whole.
The local randomness
creates
innovation
and
resilience. In free
randomness
market economies, competition is the source of local randomness,
30 The spontaneous
and regulation maintains the global structure.
structure.",,30
complexity in free markets is the basis of the
order that emerges from complexity
Id.
at 380 (footnote omitted).
26. !d.
EDGAR E. PETERS,
COMPLEXITY, RISK, AND FINANCIAL
27. EDGAR
PETERS, COMPLEXITY,
FINANCIAL MARKETS 52 (1999).
(1999).
Id.at 50-51,
50-51,160.
28. !d.
160.
For example, from a complexity
complexity theory perspective, federalism is a patching algorithm
29. For
algorithm that
provides mechanisms for both innovation
innovation within patches (policy
(policy making within states)
states) and order (policy
making
federal government)
by the
government) that are necessary for an adaptive and resilient governance
making by
the federal
governance system.
Deregulatory policies
Deregulatory
policies of complete
complete federal
federal preemption
preemption of state authority
authority should be approached
approached with
caution for such policies eliminate the mechanisms for innovation and experimentation
experimentation within the states.
caution
The Telecommunications
Economy, supra
21, at 399-402.
The
Telecommunications Economy,
supra note 21,
supranote 27, at 6.
30. PETERS, supra
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"invisible hand"
"invisible
hand" described
described by Adam Smith. 331' In other words,
resulting from a free market
market economy, as if by
economic efficiency
efficiency reSUlting
property of a market economy
"invisible hand,"
an "invisible
hand," is an emergent property
(under certain conditions).
infrastructure provides
An institutional infrastructure
provides the global structure
structure to
sustain the market economy. Referring to the rise of the Western
economic institutional
World, North states that "[t]he
"[t]he economic
institutional structure was
made possible by the evolution
eventually provided a
evolution of polities that eventually
framework
framework is an
framework of law and its enforcement. Such a framework
exchange that is necessary
essential
essential requirement for the impersonal
impersonal exchange
necessary
economic growth.,,32
for economic
growth. 32 As for modem
modern markets, Fligstein asserts that
"[o]ne
"[0
]ne cannot overestimate
overestimate the importance of governments to modern
modem
states,
non-rent-seeking
markets. Without stable, more or less non-rent-seeking
33
exist."
not
would
markets
modem production
production
would not exist. ,,33
"societal solutions to the
Government plays a critical role in "societal
of
problems
problems of property
property rights, governance
governance structures, conceptions
conceptions of
34
exchange.,,,34 Through provision of various
control, and rules of exchange.
bodies of law, such as property rights and contract
contract principles, as well
their
enforcement,
government provides
for
as governance
governance structure
structure
enforcement, government
provides
institutional prerequisites
prerequisites for market exchange
exchange and economic
35
development.35
Yet, the rule of law-or
law-or limits on government
government power-is also
36 Constraints on
necessary for the sustainability
sustainability of market capitalism.36
on
government
government power are particularly
particularly important
important to protect
protect investors who

31. Id.
31.
Id at
at 4.
OF EcONOMIC
ECONOMIC CHANGE
133 (2005).
32. DoUGLASS
DOUGLASS C.
C. NORTH,
UNDERSTANDING THE
32.
NORTH, UNDERSTANDING
THE PROCESS
PROCESS OF
CHANGE 133
(2005).
ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY
SOCIOLOGY OF
OF MARKETS:
33. NEIL
NEIL FLIGsTEIN,
THE ARCHITECTURE
33.
FLIGSTEIN, THE
ARCHITECTURE OF
MARKETS: AN
AN ECONOMIC
OF TWENTYTwENTY(2001).
FIRST-CENTURY
FIRST-CENTURY CAPITALIST
CAPITALIST SOCIETIES 33 (2001).
Id.
at
34. Id.
at 97.
97.
TRIUMPHS IN
IN THE
THE
HERNANDO DE
DE SOTO,
MYSTERY OF
OF CAPITAL:
35. See HERNANDO
SOTO, THE
THE MYSTERY
CAPITAL: WHY
WHY CAPITALISM
CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS
WEST
WEST AND
AND FAILS EVERYWHERE
EVERYWHERE ELSE 153-72 (2000). See also William
William Kovacic, Institutional
Institutional
for Economic Legal
Legal Reform in Transition
TransitionEconomies:
Case of
Competition Policy
Policy and
Foundations
Foundationsfor
Economies: The Case
ojCompetition
(2001).
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 265,269-72
265,269-72 (2001).
Antitrust Enforcement,
Enforcement, 77 CHI.-KENT
OF
133-36. See also
also BRIAN
BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA,
TAMANAHA, ON THE
supra note 32, at 83-85,
36. See NORTH,
NORTH, supra
83-85,133-36.
THE RULE
RULE OF
FUTURE OF
ILLIBERAL
LAW: HISTORY,
POLITICS, THEORY
THEORY 97
LAW:
HISTORY, POLITICS,
97 (2004);
(2004); FAREED
FAREED ZAKARIA,
ZAKARJA, THE
THE FUTURE
OF FREEDOM:
FREEDOM: ILLIBERAL
ABROAD 77
77 (2003).
(2003).
DEMOCRACY AT
DEMOCRACY
AT HOME
HOME AND
AND ABROAD

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol24/iss4/2
HeinOnline -- 24 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 954 2007-2008

8

Cherry: Maintaining Critical Rules to Enable Sustainable Communications I
2008)
20081

MAINTAINING
MAINTAINING CRITICAL RULES

955

are vulnerable to expropriation
expropriation of their investments
investments in the sunk37costs
telecommunications
as
infrastructures, such
of utility infrastructures,
such as telecommunications networks.
networks. 37
economies,
With recent efforts to transition from planned economies,
economists
economists have increasingly
increasingly been concerned
concerned with understanding
understanding
how the necessary process of institutional
institutional evolution will occur to
support market economies. For example,
example, Hoff and Stiglitz find that
mass privatization
premature in Russia
privatization of state enterprises was premature
because
asset-stripping weakened
weakened the capacity
capacity of the
because conditions of asset-stripping
38 Similarly, Kovacic stresses the
enforce the rule of law. 38
state to enforce
institutional prerequisites
prerequisites required
required by transition
transition economies
economies to support
39
39
economic
economic development. The necessary legal reform
reform includes the
creation
of
a
private
property
rights
system,
establishment
of contract
contract
property
creation
principles
enforcement mechanisms, recognition of varying
varying
principles and enforcement
forms of business enterprises, promotion of capital formation, and
redeployment through
facilitation of the exit of assets and their redeployment
40°
4
bankruptcy
bankruptcy procedures.
procedures.
the .pursuit
deregulatory policies in wellConversely, with the.
pursuit of deregulatory
developed
of
developed market economies, some economists
economists assert that the role of
government
government has been rolled back too far. Stiglitz states that there
needs to be a balance between
between the role of government and the market,
and that a country
country can suffer from underregulation
underregulation as well as
411
4
overregulation.
overregulation. In this regard, he asserts that in the United States
deregulatory
unintentionally,
deregulatory policies of the 1990's have, albeit unintentionally,
created
created a less stable economy.42
economy. 42

37. See generally
generally BRIAN LEVY &
SPILLER, REGULATIONS,
INSTITUTIONS, AND
& PABLO
PABLO T. SPILLER,
REGULATIONS, INSTITUTIONS,
AND
COMMITMENT: COMPARATIVE
STUDIES OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS
TELECOMMUNICATIONS (1996).
(1996).
COMPARATIVE STUDIES
& Joseph E. Stiglitz, After the Big Bang? Obstacles
Obstacles to the Emergence of the Rule of
38. Karla Hoff &
of
Post-Communist Societies,
Societies, 94 AM. ECON.
REV. 753, 759--62
759-62 (2004).
Law in Post-Communist
ECON. REv.
Kovacie, supra
39. Kovacic,
supra note 35, at 269-70.
40. Id.
Id.
WORLD'S MOST
41. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ,
STIGLITZ, THE ROARING
ROARING NINETIES: A NEW HISTORY
HISTORY OF THE WORW'S
PROSPEROUS DECADE 87-114 (2003).
(2003).
Id.
42. !d.
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B. Importance
Importance o/Legal
of Legal Infrastructure/or
Infrastructurefor Sustainability
Sustainabilityo/Network
of Network
Infrastructures
Infrastructures
Just as insights from complexity theory enable us to better
governance structure in
understand the critical role of legal rules and governance
infrastructure to sustain a market economy
economy
institutional infrastructure
providing an institutional
and to reap the benefits of its "invisible
"invisible hand" emergent
emergent property, it
can also enlighten inquiry
governance
inquiry as to the critical legal rules and governance
structure
sustainable communications
communications infrastructures.
structure necessary
necessary for sustainable
infrastructures.
complexity theory particularly
particularly relevant here are that
Key insights of complexity
one of the distinctive
emergence,
distinctive properties of complex systems is emergence,
and that emergent properties evolve from rules
rules that govern system
system
behavior to keep it from becoming chaotic.
Applying these concepts, this article asserts that widespread
availability, affordability, and reliability of critical communications
communications
infrastructures
emergent properties
infrastructures are desired
desired emergent
properties of such
infrastructures,
and
that
specific
legal
rules
are
necessary
specific legal rules
necessary to provide
infrastructures,
infrastructure for the sustainability of critical
the institutional
institutional infrastructure
communications
emergent
communications networks
networks that generate such desired
desired emergent
properties. The central question then becomes: what exactly
exactly are those
legal rules necessary for communications
communications infrastructures
infrastructures to generate
properties? Relatedly, what specific
the desired emergent properties?
specific functions
generation of the desired
must those rules serve so as to enable generation
emergent
emergent properties?
properties?

II.

EXAMINING THE LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE
SUSTAINABLE
EXAMINING
INFRASTRUCTURE FOR SUSTAINABLE
UTILITY
INFRASTRUCTURES IN THE UNITED STATES
UTILITY INFRASTRUCTURES

In search of identifying such critical legal rules, this section
of
reviews aspects of my prior historical analyses of the evolution of
legal rules and the effects
effects on network infrastructures
infrastructures in the United
States
of
States which form the basis for my assertion that the sustainability
sustainability of
deregulatory
deregulatory telecommunications
telecommunications policies will likely require retention
of elements of the common law principles
principles of common carriage and
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43
public utilities. 43
It stresses the importance
importance of the common law
industry-specific regimes
principles embedded in the traditional industry-specific
under which the transportation
transportation and telecommunications
telecommunications network
infrastructures developed. Although the industry-specific
industry-specific regimes
infrastructures
enforcement of legal rules under
were augmented at times through enforcement
antitrust and consumer protection laws applicable to general
businesses, it also stresses the importance
importance of understanding the
sequencing in the coevolution
industry-specific and
temporal sequencing
coevolution of the industry-specific
general business
business statutory regimes. Importantly, the general business
poststatutory regimes of antitrust and consumer protection largely post!date
the
industry-specific
regimes
for
common
carriers
and
public
industry-specific
carriers
tdate
utilities.
significance of the industry-specific
industry-specific regimes pre-dating
pre-dating the
The significance
general business regimes is that many analyses of deregulatory
policies (that eliminated
eliminated key elements of the common carriage and
public utility regimes)
regimes) falsely assume that the general business
business
regimes can adequately
adequately solve industry-specific
industry-specific problems that such
regimes did not evolve
particularly
evolve to address. These analyses are particularly
problematic
problematic when focusing primarily on antitrust type remedies for
the wholesale market, ignoring that the resultant shift in the
interrelationship of the industry-specific
industry-specific and general business
business
interrelationship
regimes under deregulatory
deregulatory broadband
policies
may
generate
legal
broadband
generate legal
gaps for issues affecting
gaps
affecting the retail market for consumers
consumers that may no
longer be adequately
adequately addressed by either regime.

A.
DifferentialEvolution
Evolution of Industry-Specific
Industry-Specific and
and General
GeneralBusiness
A. Differential
Regimes in the United
United States

As a starting point, it is important to recognize some basic trends
in the general evolution of regulation
regulation in the United States, which is
elsewhere
discussed
in
greater
depth. 44 As a general matter,
elsewhere
43.
43. See Cherry, supra
supra note 7.
44. Barbara A. Cherry, Pursuing
Pursuing Telecommunications Legislation Through a Systems Approach
Approach to
Policymaking
Processes 1-2, Paper presented at the World Multi-Conference
Multi-Conference on
Policymaking Processes
Systemics, Cybernetics
Cybernetics and Informatics, Orlando, FL (July
(July 8-11,
8-11, 2007).
2007).
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government
institutionally in response
government regulation has evolved
evolved institutionally
response to
limitations of the existing regime to adequately respond to
technological,
technological, economic, and societal changes. More specifically,
primary
primary reliance started with the common law, shifting during the
increasing reliance on statutory
statutory law, and
Industrial Revolution to increasing
resulting
for
some
industries
in
the
delegation
of
regulatory
authority
resulting
administrative agencies. Furthermore, within the progression
of
to administrative
progression of
changed
institutional change, new bodies of law have evolved and changed
common law consisted
over time. The main bodies of law under the common
of torts (including
(including common carriage),
contracts,
and property;
carriage),
corporations and administrative
whereas, the establishment
establishment of corporations
agencies, for example, are of statutory origin, and statutory
requirements were enacted more frequently over time to address
address
requirements
inadequacies
of
common
law
requirements
and
remedies.
Moreover,
remedies.
inadequacies
institutional change and bodies of law has created
the co-evolution of institutional
coexisting industry-specific
industry-specific and
andgeneral
coexisting
general business
business regulatory
regulatory regimes,
regimes,
interrelationships change
among which the interrelationships
change over time.
Within these general trends, the institutional progression
progression of both
industry-specific (common carrier
the industry-specific
carrier and public utility) and general
many
business (antitrust and consumer protection) regimes has many
similarities.
similarities. These include placing initial reliance on the common
law, increasing
increasing reliance
reliance on statutory
statutory law, delegating some
some
enforcement
to
and
creating
coexistence
administrative
agencies,
creating
the
coexistence
enforcement
of federal and state regulation.
Yet, there are important differences
differences in the institutional progression
progression
industry-specific regimes relative
of these respective regimes. For the industry-specific
to the general business regimes, both the relevant common law and
and
statutory law developed earlier. Furthermore,
Furthermore, for the industry-specific
industry-specific
regimes, state regulation preceded federal regulation with the
commerce during the nineteenth
intrastate to interstate commerce
nineteenth
expansion of intrastate
century, and state administrative agencies were established
established prior to
the relevant
relevant federal agencies with a primary focus on protecting
consumers. In this regard, the Report of the Senate Select Committee
on Interstate
Interstate Commerce ("Cullom Report") concluded
concluded that federal
legislation for the regulation of interstate
transportation
interstate transportation of railroads
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol24/iss4/2
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was necessary
necessary and expedient
expedient because,
because, among
among other
other things:
things: state
was
regulation was
was ineffective
ineffective as
as interstate
interstate commerce
commerce was beyond
beyond the
regulation
jurisdiction of the states
states under
under the
the United
United States
States Constitution;
Constitution;
jurisdiction
forms
the
myriad
to
address
common
law
remedies
inadequate
address
inadequate
were
common law remedies
of discrimination
discrimination imposed
imposed on customers;
customers; and statutory
statutory regulation
regulation was
of
ineffective without
without providing
providing adequate
adequate machinery,
machinery, here
here a
likely to be ineffective
45
45
its execution.
execution. As
As a result, the
the Interstate
Interstate Commerce
Commerce
commission, for its
Act was enacted
enacted in 1887, creating
creating the Interstate Commerce
Commerce
Act
46
ICC jurisdiction
Commission (ICC) with jurisdiction
jurisdiction over railroads.46
jurisdiction
was
was extended
extended to telegraphy
telegraphy and telephony
telephony in 1910,
1910, and subsequently
subsequently
47
47
1934.
replaced by the FCC in 1934.
business regime, the federal statutory
However, for the general business
regimes preceded
preceded the state
state statutory regimes,
regimes, and initially
initially to protect
protect
48
business competitors before consumers.
Sherman
consumers.48 For example, the Sherman
1890,
in 1890,
of
1887)
Act
Commerce
Interstate
the
Act was enacted
enacted (after
Commerce
49
creating the first federal antitrust statute. Both the Clayton Act and
the Federal
Federal Trade Commission Act were enacted in 1914, with the
creating the FTC (whereas the ICC was created in 1887)
1887) but its
latter creating
business
of
protecting
authority directed for the purpose
business
authority
50
Commission Act
Trade Commission
competitors. 50 It was not until the Federal Trade
45. S. REP.NO.
REp. No. 49-46, pts. I &
& 2 (1886).
(1886).
95-473, § 4(b), 92 Stat. 1467
repealed by Pub. L. 95-473,
104, 24 Stat. 379, repealed
46. Act of
of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104,
(1978).
(1978).
framework
the statutory framework
based on the
was based
creating the FCC, was
1934, creating
47. The Communications
Communications Act of 1934,
Act of June
nearly verbatim. Act
language nearly
of the language
copied much of
created in the Interstate
Commerce Act and copied
Interstate Commerce
104-104,
of 1996,
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104,
Telecommunications Act of
repealed by Telecommunications
Stat. 1064,
1064, repealed
19, 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat.
110 Stat.
Stat. 56 (1996).
(1996).
Judicial
Protection Law: Judicial
Consumer Protection
Applications of Consumer
& D.A. Ballam, New Applications
48. See J.R. Franke &
(1992).
347,350-58 (1992).
REv. 347,350-58
Activism or
Directive?,32 SANTA CLARA L. REv.
or Legislative
Legislative Directive?,
or
as agreements or
as well as
of monopolization as
49. The Shennan
Sherman Act prohibited certain forms of
§§ 1-7
1-7 (2000).
15 U.S.C. §§
Act, 15
of trade. Sherman Act,
in restraint
restraint of
conspiracies in
conspiracies
of price
price
forms of
certain forms
that expressly
expressly prohibited certain
federal statute that
50.
first federal
Act was
was the first
50. The Clayton Act
"to the
1936 to assure that, ''to
further amended by the Robinson-Patman Act in 1936
and was further
discrimination, and
discrimination,
level would stand on equal
functional level
the same functional
extent
practicable, businessmen at the
extent reasonably practicable,
General
Robinson-Patman Act: General
Clark, The Robinson-Patman
price." Donald S. Clark,
with regard to price."
competitive
competitive footing with
Ambit Group
the Ambit
presented before the
Issues, Speech
Speech presented
Selected Issues,
and Selected
Proceedings,and
Commission Proceedings,
PrinCiples,
Principles,Commission
Act
The Robinson-Patman
Robinson-Patman Act
CA (1995).
(1995). The
San Jose,
Jose, CA
Industry, San
the Computer
Computer Industry,
for the
Retail
Conference for
Retail Channel Conference
telecommunications
as rail
rail and
and telecommunications
services-such as
to the
the sale
sale of
of services-such
and not to
of commodities,
commodities, and
to the sale of
applies to
applies
of Price
Price
State Law
Law of
Federal and
and State
of the
the Federal
and Update
Update of
An Overview and
Saferstein, An
Harvey I.I. Saferstein,
services.
services. Harvey
(2005).
135, 169-79
169-79 (2005).
SERIES 135,
HANDBOOK SERIES
& PRAC.
PRAC. HANDBOOK
CORP. L.
L. &
L. INST.
INST. CORP.
1485 PRACTICING
PRACTICING L.
Discrimination,
Discrimination,1485
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was amended in 1938
1938 that the FTC was given the responsibility
responsibility to
regulate unfair and deceptive
commerce for
deceptive acts or practices affecting commerce
the purpose of protecting
protecting consumers. In the 1960's and 1970's,
Congress passed numerous statutes to protect consumers against
unfair practices, and increased enforcement
enforcement and regulatory authority
of the FTC. Yet, it was not until the 1960's and 1970's,
1970's, at the FTC's
FTC's
urging, that most states adopted statutes to curb unfair or deceptive
acts and practices. Some state statutes directly provided
provided private
causes of action
action and associated remedies, whereas some other state
legislatures gave state courts a mandate to create a common law of
of
unfair trade practices. 5'I The enactment of such state statutes for
of
general consumer protection purposes
purposes long post-dates
post-dates the creation
creation of
the state commissions
commissions governing common carriers
carriers and public utilities
that were established with jurisdiction over telecommunications
telecommunications
beginning
beginning in the late nineteenth century and in the majority of states
by the 1920's.

B. Relevance ofDifferential
Issues of Consumer
B.
ofDifferential Evolution
Evolution to Issues
Sovereignty
Sovereignty
Averitt and Lande define consumer
of
consumer sovereignty
sovereignty "as the state of
affairs in which consumers
consumers have an unimpaired
unimpaired ability to make
decisions
in
their
individual
decisions
individual interests and markets operate efficiently
efficiently
in responding to the collective
decisions." 52
52 They
collective effect of those decisions."
assert that antitrust and consumer protection
protection laws share a common
common
sovereignty or effective
purpose to facilitate the exercise of consumer
consumer sovereignty
53
Antitrust law is intended
intended to ensure that a
consumer choice. 53 Antitrust
meaningful range
range of options
options is available
available to consumers
consumers through
through
market competition.
protect the
competition. Consumer protection laws seek to protect
ability of consumers
consumers to freely choose
choose among such options.
ability
options.

51. See
51.
See Franke
Franke &
& Ballam,
BaHam, supra note 48, at 355-424.
52. Neil
W. Averitt
Averitt &
& Robert H. Lande,
Sovereignty: A
A Unified
Unified Theory of Antitrust and
Lande, Consumer
Consumer Sovereignty:
52.
Neil W.
Consumer Protection
713, 722-23 (1997).
(1997).
Consumer
Protection Law, 65 ANTITRUST
ANTITRUST L.J. 713,722-23
53. Id.
[d. at 723.
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The
The antitrust
antitrust and consumer
consumer protection
protection laws
laws are
are applicable
applicable to
common carriers
general businesses.
businesses. The
The industry-specific
industry-specific regimes of common
general
consumer
and public utilities were
were designed
designed to address
address issues
issues of consumer
and
the
relevant
which
sovereignty
by
significantly
different
which
relevant
means,
for
different
significantly
sovereignty
administrative
preempting
administrative agencies have primary jurisdiction, often preempting
general business regime.
the applicability
applicability of the general
the
consumer sovereignty, the basic
basic trends in the
With respect to consumer
With
general evolution of regulation
regulation in the United States
States have
have specific
specific
general
characteristics.
fundamentally, the general business
business
characteristics. Perhaps most fundamentally,
regime
consumer protection
protection laws coevolved
coevolved withwithregime of antitrust and consumer
the
industry-specific
of
largely post-dates-the
and largely
post-dates-the development
development
industry-specific
legal regimes for common carriers
carriers and public
public utilities that originated
originated
54
telecommunications.
to
applied
with railroads and was subsequently
subsequently applied to telecommunications. 54
sequence is critical,
Recognition of this temporal
temporal sequence
critical, as the statutory
industry-specific
general
regime evolved
evolved as an adjunct to the industry-specific
general business regime
statutory regimes. As a result, in numerous cases and circumstances
circumstances
preempted or superseded
the general
general business regime has been preempted
superseded by the
industry-specific
industry-specific regimes, and, for such situations, further evolution
evolution
covered
issues
not
addressed
thereby
regime
of the general business
covered
traditional industry-specific
Therefore, as the
industry-specific regimes. Therefore,
by the traditional
deregulatory
traditional industry-specific
industry-specific regimes change under deregulatory
interrelationships between
policies, the resulting interrelationships
between the industry-specific
industry-specific
In
some ways, the
shift.
and general business
business regimes necessarily
necessarily
applicability to the
general business regime may now have greater applicability
general
whether the general
"deregulated"
industries, but it is unclear whether
"deregulated" industries,
business regime will adequately address the situations or
circumstances that had previously been addressed
addressed by the traditional
traditional
circumstances
deregulatory policies may
industry-specific regimes. For this reason, deregulatory
"legal gap" for which some issues may no longer be
generate a "legal
adequately addressed by either the general business or the
adequately
deregulatorily adjusted industry-specific regimes.
deregulatorily

telecommunications and
the legal regulatory regimes for the telecommunications
54. For a comparison of the evolution of the
supranote 2.
transportation sectors, see Cherry, supra
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C. Importance
Importance of Common Law Principles
Principles
C.

As discussed at length in prior work,55
55 the original regulatory
regime for common carriers and public utilities in the United States
evolved under the common law. Common carriers, merely by virtue
status as public employments, or public callings, bore unique
of their status
tort law to serve upon reasonable request without
obligations under tort
discrimination, to charge just and reasonable prices, and to exercise
56 They were also
their calling with adequate care, skill and honesty. 56
subject to a common law rule of strict liability, except for damages
arising from acts of God or war, and with severe limitations on the
of
ability to contract out of such tort liability. The common law of
public utilities subsequently
subsequently evolved
in
the
United
States
during
the
evolved
nineteenth century, incorporating
common
incorporating the tort obligations of common
carriers to which was added an affirmative
carriers
affirmative duty to extend facilities to
provide service with a corresponding barrier to exit. 57 To enable
public utilities to remain financially viable
viable while satisfying
satisfying these
these
additional obligations, they were protected
protected from competitive entry
typically through monopoly franchises.
Statutory
Statutory regimes arose in the United States during the late
nineteenth and early twentieth
twentieth centuries
centuries when common
common law remedies
became
became inadequate to address the economic
economic abuses
abuses of large
58
corporations.
Industry-specific statutory
statutory regimes included the
corporations. 58 Industry-specific
creation
expert administrative
administrative agencies to which regulatory
creation of expert
authority
was
delegated
by the legislature. 59
59 The statutory
statutory regimes
authority
arose initially
later adopted for telegraph and
initially for railroads
railroads
and
were
60
telephone
telephone companies.
companies. 6o
55.
55. Barbara
Barbara A.
A. Cherry,
Cherry, The Political
Political Realities
Realities of
of Telecommunications Policies
Policies in the US.:
u.s.: How
How the
Legacy of
ofPublic
Public Utility Regulation
Regulation Constrains
Constrains Adoption ofNew Regulatory
Regulatory Models, 2003
2003 MICH.
MICH. ST. L.
REV.
(2003) [hereinafter
Political Realities];
Realities]; Barbara
Barbara A. Cherry,
Cherry, Utilizing "Essentiality
"Essentiality of
of
REv. 757,
757, 761-67
761-{i7 (2003)
[hereinafter Political
Access"
Access" Analyses
Analyses to Mitigate
Mitigate Risky, Costly and Untimely Government Interventions
Interventions in Converging
Telecommunications
(2003)
11 COMMLAW
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
CONSPECTUS 251,
251, 256-58
256-58 (2003)
Telecommunications Technologies and Markets,
Markets, 11
[hereinafter
Essentiality of Access]; Cherry,
Cherry, supra
supra note 2,
2, at 275-277.
[hereinafter Essentiality
56. Essentiality
Essentiality ofAccess,
ofAccess, supra
supra note
note 55, at
at 257.
57. Id.
Id.
58. Id.
Id. at 258.
258.
59. Id
Id.
60. Id
Id.
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The common
common law legal
legal principles-also,
principles-also, importantly, retained
retained
under the statutory
regimes~volved to address
address specific
specific types of
of
statutory regimes-evolved
61
6
access
access problems
problems regarding
regarding essential
essential services
services or facilities. The
common
economic
common carrier
carrier obligations
obligations evolved
evolved to address
address problems
problems of economic
coercion
coercion between
between the carrier
carrier and its customers,
customers, whereas
whereas the
additional public utility obligation
obligation to serve was imposed
imposed to assure the
additional
availability
essential service to all customers.
customers.62
62
availability of an essential
The common
common law obligations
obligations of
of common
common carriers
carriers can be seen as an
early
protection, later
later codified
codified into statutory
early form of consumer protection,
of
industry-specific
industry-specific regimes, that long
long predates
predates the enactment
enactment of
general
businesses
in
the
consumer
protection
laws
applicable
to
consumer protection
applicable
general businesses
63
United States.
Furthermore, public utility obligations
obligations can be viewed
viewed
States.63
as an early form of welfare
welfare state regulation,
regulation, given the purpose to
better ensure availability
availability of an essential service, that also long
after
commonly
recognized rise of the welfare
more
the
predates
welfare state after
predates
commonly recognized
64
the Great Depression.
1. Importance
1.
Importance ofPublic
Public Utility Principles
Principles
Deregulatory
Deregulatory policies
policies in the transportation
transportation sector began
began in the
encouraged by a shift in political philosophy favoring
1970's, encouraged
competition
competition over regulation and by the rise of intermodal competition
65 In this regard,
accelerated
containerization. 65
accelerated by the technique
technique of containerization.
deregulatory
deregulatory transportation
transportation policies modified
modified the statutory regimes
regimes
but retained important components
common law regimes. Each
components of the common
mode of transportation-rail,
transportation-rail, air, and motor carrier-is still
defined as common carriers. Specific elements
statutorily defmed
elements of the
61. Id.
Id.at 259.
6\.
62. Additional legal principles
principles later evolved to address yet other types of access problems regarding
essential services
services or facilities: the essential facilities doctrine
doctrine to address refusals to deal with
access to targeted
end users; and viewpoint diversity
competitors;
competitors; universal service programs to ensure access
targeted end
effectuate free
as a government
government goal to justify
justify regulation
regulation of owners of channels of communication
communication to effectuate
ofAccess,
supra
speech rights under the First Amendment
Amendment of the United States Constitution. Essentiality
Essentiality of
Access, supra
note 55,
257-62.
55, at 257--62.
supranote 3, at 7-10.
63. See Cherry, supra
770-71.
PoliticalRealities,
Realities,supra
supranote 55, at 770-7\.
64. Political
Cherry, supra
supra note 2, at 278.
65. See Cherry,
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reasonable request,
common carriage
carriage obligations-to serve upon reasonable
discrimination, at reasonable
without unreasonable
unreasonable discrimination,
reasonable prices, and with
of
care-are still imposed, although their manner of
adequate care-are
services or
or
expression and enforcement
enforcement varies by mode and among services
deregulatory transportation
transportation regimes
customers within modes. The deregulatory
also contain
contain mechanisms that continue to serve public utility
requirements,
functions, including
including a combination of entry and exit requirements,
infrastructure and/or carriers, and universal
government ownership of infrastructure
customers or
service subsidy programs
programs to benefit targeted
targeted groups of customers
areas. As with the common carriage
carriage obligations, the manner in
which the public utility functions are addressed varies by mode as
well as among customers
customers within modes.
However, some of the mechanisms
mechanisms established
established to fulfill public
66 For
utility functions are having
sustainability problems.66
having recurring
recurring sustainability
example, Congress's current
current approach to intercity passenger rail
service-the most significant
service-the
significant component
component of which is Amtrak-is
considered unsustainable
at
historical
funding levels. In addition,
unsustainable
trends in the aviation
aviation industry and rising costs are jeopardizing
jeopardizing the
Service program
program that provides
long-term viability of the Essential Air Service
subsidies to induce new or additional air service
service to communities.
communities.
In some ways, deregulatory
deregulatory policies
in
the
telecommunications
policies
telecommunications
transportation
sector have followed a similar trajectory
trajectory to that in the transportation
"There is increasing
increasing variance as to how common carriage
carriage
sector. "There
services
obligations are being applied among providers of new services
enabled by digitization and the Internet; [and] the current
current funding
mechanism
mechanism for federal universal service support
support fund67is generally
generally
run."
long
the
in
unsustainable
considered economically
economically unsustainable in the long run.,,67
In terms of whether critical
critical infrastructures
infrastructures will continue to be
generally available throughout the country, the sustainability
problems
post-deregulatory mechanisms
problems of the post-deregulatory
mechanisms intended to serve
public utility functions are a significant
significant problem for both the
transportation
transportation and telecommunications
telecommunications sectors. Shifting primary
66. Id.
Id.at 283.
67. Id.
Id.at 274.
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reliance from
from implicit
implicit subsidies
subsidies contained
contained in price
price structures
structures of
of
reliance
regulated monopolies
monopolies to explicitly
explicitly funded
funded subsidy
subsidy programs
programs is
regulated
68
The
proving to be
be aa less politically
politically stable
stable regime.
regime.68
The greater
greater political
political
proving
instability
instability of
of residualistic
residualistic (targeted)
(targeted) as opposed
opposed to universalistic
universalistic
tend
the
former
programs-even though
though
former tend to
to be less
benefit programs--even
benefit
expensive-has long been
been recognized
recognized by political
political scientists. 69 The
expensive-has
of universalistic
universalistic programs
programs is illustrated
illustrated by
by
greater political
political stability
stability of
greater
during which
which monopoly legal regimes-whether
regimes-whether by
by
the long periods during
remains
It
privately or publicly
publicly owned
owned infrastructures-prevailed.
infrastructures-prevailed.
privately
unclear whether
whether the economic-political
economic-political dynamics
dynamics underlying
underlying
unclear
acceptable levels
sustainable
societally acceptable
levels
sustainable policies can over time provide societally
of available
available critical transportation
transportation and telecommunications
telecommunications
legal
regimes.
infrastructures
under
deregulatory,
competitive
legal
deregulatory,
infrastructures
Obligations
2. Importance
Importance of Common Carriage
Carriage Obligations
In other ways, deregulatory
deregulatory policies in the telecommunications
telecommunications

sector are treading a trajectory
trajectory that differs from that in the
elimination
transportation sector. Perhaps the most significant is the elimination
transportation
carriage obligations for provision
of common carriage
provision of broadband access
Cable Modem Declaratory
in
its Cable
rulings
Declaratory
services as a result of FCC
71
7°
In so doing, the
Ruling70 and
Order.71
BroadbandAccess Order.
Wireline Broadband
and Wireline
Ruling
FCC has eliminated the centuries-old solution under the common law
to address problems of economic coercion between the provider of an
of
essential service or facility and its customers through imposition of
obligations to serve upon reasonable request without unreasonable
(just) prices and with adequate care, skill
discrimination at reasonable (just)
and honesty. As a result, not only the traditional statutory regime but
to
eliminated with regard to
foundation has been eliminated
its common law foundation
also
also its
broadband infrastructure.

285-286.
supranote 2, at 285-286.
68.
788-89; Cherry, supra
at 788-89;
supranote 55, at
Realities,supra
68. Political
PoliticalRealities,
HISTORICAL
IN HISTORICAL
POSSIBILITIES IN
FUTURE POSSIBILITIES
69.
STATES: FuTURE
THE UNITED
UNITED STATES:
IN THE
SOCIAL POLICY IN
SKOCPOL, SOCIAL
THEDA SKOCPOL,
69. THEDA
(1995).
250-74 (1995).
PERSPECTIVE 250-74
PERSPECTIVE
supra note 5.
70.
Modem Declaratory
Declaratory Ruling, supra
Cable Modem
See generally
generallyCable
70. See
note 6.
Order, supra
supranote
Broadband Access Order,
See generally
generallyWireline Broadband
71. See
71.
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The elimination of the common law scaffolding for application to
infrastructure has triggered debate regarding important
broadband infrastructure
neutrality. 72 Although lacking a precise
issues related to network neutrality.72
precise
definition, the diversity of goals, problems, and remedies raised in the
of
network neutrality debate relate to concerns with varying forms of
discrimination by broadband providers against customers or
or
73
73
competitors. The significance
significance to the discussion here is that
elimination of common carriage obligations for the provision of
of
of
broadband access services has reintroduced problems of
discrimination that now lack the legally enforceable
enforceable remedies for
discrimination
which the common law principles and the later traditional statutory
regime had been erected. Consequently, the dismantling of the
infrastructure is requiring construction
construction of a new one
historical legal infrastructure
applicability to broadband
for applicability
broadband access services.
telecommunications policies
As a result, deregulatory
deregulatory telecommunications
policies are shifting
the boundaries between
industry-specific and general
between the traditional industry-specific
74 Given that the general business regime
business regimes. 74
of
of
antitrust and consumer protection law largely
largely post-dates
post-dates the
development of the industry-specific
industry-specific legal regimes for common
common
development
carriers
superseded by
carriers and public
public utilities, and has been preempted
preempted or superseded
the industry-specific
regimes
in
numerous
cases
and
circumstances,
industry-specific regimes numerous
circumstances, it
is unclear
unclear whether
whether the general
general business regime
regime will adequately
adequately
circumstances that had previously been
address situations
situations or circumstances
been
addressed
by
the traditional
addressed
traditional industry-specific
industry-specific regimes. "For this
reason, deregulatory
deregulatory policies
may
generate
policies
generate a legal gap for which
which
some issues related to consumer sovereignty
sovereignty may no longer
longer be
adequately addressed
adequately
addressed by either the general business
business or the
75
deregulatorily
deregulatorily adjusted
adjusted industry-specific
industry-specific regimes.
regimes.,,75
For broadband
access
services
relative
broadband access
relative to the narrowband
narrowband
telecommunications
telecommunications services,
services, the
the ensuing legal
legal gap between
between the
72. See
See Cherry, supra
supra note
note 7,
7, at 485-90;
485-90; Cherry, supra
supra note
note 3,
3, atat 29-31.
29-31.
73. See
See Cherry, supra
supra note
note 7,
7, at 485-87.
485-87.
74.
74. For
For aa detailed
detailed discussed
discussed of
of the
the evolving
evolving interrelationship
interrelationship between
between deregulatory
deregulatory industry-specific
industry-specific
and
telecommunications and broadband
the United States,
States, see
see
and general
general business
business regimes
regimes for
for telecommunications
broadband services
services in the
Cherry, supra
13-31.
supra note
note 3,
3, at 13-31.
75.
75. See
See Cherry, supra
supra note
note 3,
3, at 31.
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general
business and industry-specific
general business
industry-specific regimes will likely be
76
76
new
greater. This is because the FCC is attempting to construct a new
legal regime under its Title I ancillary jurisdiction
jurisdiction under the
Communications Act of 1934-a
1934-a more constrained scope of
of
Communications
jurisdiction in contrast to the common carriage
carriage statutory regime
under Title II-and thereby a new interface with the general business
consumer protection law. The adverse
regime of antitrust and consumer
consequences
for
consumers
as opposed
consequences
opposed to competitors of broadband
particularly troublesome
troublesome because the network neutrality
providers is particularly
debate has tended
tended to be focused primarily on the provider-tocompetitor relationship
solely on
competitor
relationship and "[a]dvocates
"[a]dvocates of a regime based solely
antitrust fail to explain how the issues pertaining to the provider-toof
customer relationship, that have been governed by the ex ante rules of
industry-specific common
carriage regulation, will be adequately
adequately
industry-specific
common carriage
77
remedies." Furthermore, without the
addressed by antitrust ex post remedies.',77
protection of the traditional
traditional ex ante rules embedded in common
common law
common carriage obligations, myriad forms of discrimination are
access at
legally permissible and threaten
threaten consumers'
consumers' ability to have access
reasonable prices and under reasonable
reasonable terms and conditions.
Inter-InfrastructureEffects
3. Importance
Importance of Inter-Infrastructure

Unfortunately, the consequences
consequences of eliminating
elimina~ing common carriage
obligations
for
broadband
access
services
obligations
access services are not likely to be
contained to just broadband
because
contained
broadband access to the Internet. This is because
infrastructure both competes
the broadband infrastructure
competes and interconnects with
infrastructures.
other critical infrastructures.
First, the FCC has now "create
"create[d]
intramodal asymmetric
[d] intramodal
regulation between telecommunications
telecommunications carriers'
carriers' narrowband
narrowband and
and
regulation
broadband networks-with
networks-with common carriage required for the former
78 Due to the differential economic effects of
of
latter.,,78
but not the latter."
differing regulatory obligations on these competing
competing networks, "such
"such
76. Id.
Id. at29-31.
at 29-31.
Cherry,supra
77. See Cherry,
supra note 7, at 502 (emphasis
(emphasis omitted).
(footnotes omitted).
78. Id.
Id. at 498 (footnotes
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asymmetry may
may ultimately lead
lead to
to the unavailability
unavailability of any
any common
service, whether
whether narrowband
narrowband or broadband.
broadband. Thus,
carriage-provided service,
the .. .. .. economic
economic [and
[and welfare] rights
rights of individuals as end users of
of
the
both narrowband and
and broadband services could be adversely
both
79 To the extent that broadband
affected.,
affected.,,79
networks also compete with
cable and
and broadcasting networks, the elimination of nonobligations-not otherwise provided by other legal
discrimination obligations-not
requirements-may also adversely affect citizen's free speech
requirements-may
rights.880°
Second, the deregulatory
deregulatory broadband policies may ultimately lead
unintended consequences for the United States Postal
to devastating, unintended
"[T]he financial viability
Service (USPS). "[T]he
viability of the USPS is now being
threatened, in large part, by electronic
electronic substitution of correspondence
correspondence
over the Internet.,,81
Internet."1 To address the financial unsustainability
unsustainability of the
USPS' current business model, the President's Commission on the
USPS'
United States Postal System recommends
recommends that the USPS become
more Internet-dependent
Internet-dependent through
through both coordination of internal
82 This
operations
and
provision
of
value-added
value-added services to customers. 82
operations
deregulatory broadband
raises questions
questions as to the long-term effects
effects of deregulatory
broadband
of
policies on the financial sustainability and ubiquitous deployment of
the postal
postal system:
Will
Will there be de facto erosion of common carriage
carriage of the postal
customers? Will the geographic
system that adversely affects
affects customers?
geographic
availability
availability of postal service significantly
significantly deteriorate?
deteriorate? What
What will
be the implications
implications for free speech rights?
rights? How might
government
interest
in
viewpoint
diversity
government interest
viewpoint diversity be
be adversely
adversely
impacted-keeping
have long played
played
impacted-keeping in mind that postal policies have
aa significant
significant role
role in
in the
the evolution
evolution of the press and
and other print
media?...
It
certainly
seems incongruous
incongruous to eliminate
eliminate common
media? ...
carriage
obligations
for
providers
of
broadband
carriage obligations for providers of broadband Internet access
79.
79.
80.
80.
81.
81.
82.
82.

Id.
Id. (footnotes
(footnotes omitted).
omitted).
See
ofAccess,
See id.
id. at
at 505-10;
505-10; Essentiality
Essentialilyoj
Access, supra
supra note
note 55,
55, atat 272-74.
272-74.
See Cherry,
Cherry, supra
supra note
note 7,
7, at
at 508
508 (footnote
(footnote omitted).
omitted).
Id.
Id. at
at 509
509 (footnotes
(footnotes omitted).
omitted).
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increasing the dependence
dependence of the USPS,
while simultaneously
simultaneously increasing
USPS, a
83
Internet.
the
on
itself,
carrieritself, on the Internet. 83
common carrier

communications infrastructure
interconnects with other
Third, the communications
infrastructure interconnects
critical infrastructures,
infrastructures, such as transportation
transportation and electricity. Outages,
Outages,
performance characteristics
characteristics in one infrastructure
failures, and performance
infrastructure can
performance in the others. For
dramatically and adversely affect performance
increasingly reliant
example, transportation networks have become increasingly
telecommunications services, including airport operations
on telecommunications
operations and
highway traffic monitoring and toll systems. Outages in
telecommunications services can trigger congestion and even total
telecommunications
suspension of transportation services for substantial
substantial periods of time.
interdependence of the telecommunications
The interdependence
telecommunications and electricity
of
Blackout of
networks is demonstrated by the effects of the Northeast Blackout
2003 on the cellular
telecommunications
network.
A
blackout
that
cellular telecommunications
began in the electricity grid in Ohio not only cascaded to blackouts
blackouts in
other states but also disrupted
disrupted the cellular network as the backup
batteries ran dry prior to restoration of service in the electricity
electricity grid.
Potential adverse consequences
consequences for transportation
transportation and electricity
electricity
interconnection and reliance on
networks may increase as their interconnection
packet-switched communications
broadband, packet-switched
communications services grows.
packet-switched networks are less
Fundamental reasons are that packet-switched
secure and reliable than traditional wireline, circuit-switched
circuit-switched
85
extremely fragile
is extremely
networks, 84 and the Internet is
networks,84
fragile to
to targeted
targeted attacks.
attacks. 85
asymmetric regulation hastens
To the extent that intramodal asymmetric
broadband for narrowband
narrowband networks, higher security
substitution of broadband
risks and lower network reliability of the communications
communications
accelerates with cascading
cascading effects to the transportation
infrastructure accelerates
transportation
and electricity networks.
83. ld.
Id. at 509-10 (emphasis
(emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
84.
RICHARD KUHN
OF COMMERCE,
SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
FOR VOICE
VOICE
84. D.
D. RICHARD
KUHN ET AL.,
AL., U.S.
U;S. DEP'T
DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, SECURITY
CONSIDERATIONS FOR
OVER
SYSTEMS: RECOMMENDATIONS
INSTITUTE OF
STANDARDS AND
OVER IP SYSTEMS:
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL INSTlnITE
OF STANDARDS
AND
TECHNOLOGY,
NIST
800-58,
(2005),
TECHNOLOGY,
SPECIAL
PUBLICATION
at
7
available at
al

800-58,

(2005),

http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-58/SP800-58-final.pdf.
http://csrc.nist.gov/publicationslnistpubsl800-58/SP800-58-final.pdf.
85.
ROMUALDO PASTOR-SATORRAS
PASTOR-SATORRAS &
& ALESSANDRO
VESPIGNANI, EVOLUTION
AND STRUCTURE
STRUCTURE
85. See ROMUALDO
ALESSANDRO VESPIGNANI,
EVOLUTION AND
OF
INTERNET: A STATISTICAL
STATISTICAL PHYSICS APPROACH,
APPROACH, 112-39
112-39 (2004).
OF THE
THE iNTERNET:
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D. Importance
D.
Importance of Liability
Liability Rules
Another way in which telecommunications
telecommunications sector has followed a
different policy trajectory
trajectory from the transportation sector
sector is with
86
86
regard to their respective
legal
liability
regimes.
The initial
respective
deviation
deviation occurred
occurred during the evolution of the traditional, statutory
industry-specific
industry-specific regimes. Over time the common law doctrine had
evolved
carrier liability in contracts, referred to as
evolved that limitations of carrier
valuation
agreements, are not enforceable
valuation agreements,
enforceable unless the customer
customer is
given a choice of rates under which full liability is an option and the
rate is tied to the level of liability accepted
accepted by the carrier. Meanwhile,
when the statutory industry-specific regime required carriers to file
tariffs containing
containing rates, terms and conditions of services with the
expert regulatory
regulatory commission, courts developed
developed the filed rate
doctrine in addressing
addressing disputes challenging
challenging the validity or
reasonableness
reasonableness of tariffs. The filed rate doctrine required that a given
rate and its associated terms and conditions must be applied nondiscriminatorily among customers. In Union
Union Pacific
Pacific R.R. Co.
Co. v.
87
Burke,
Burke,87 the Supreme
Supreme Court held that the common
common law rule affecting
affecting
valuation
valuation contracts
contracts was not altered
altered by the filed rate doctrine
doctrine
applicable to tariffs filed by railroad carriers. The same result was
effectively applied to telegraph carriers by virtue of the Supreme
88
Co. 88
Co. v.
Union Tel.
Tel. Co.
v. Esteve
Esteve Bros
Bros &
& Co.
Court's decision
decision in Western Union
and a subsequent order by the Interstate Commerce
Commerce Commission
Commission
(then also with jurisdiction
jurisdiction over telegraph and telephone carriers) in
Limitations
on
Liability in Connection
Connection with the Transmission
Transmission of
of
Limitations
Liability
89
89
Telegraph
Messages. However, decades later this legal framework
Telegraph Messages.
was subsequently misapplied to telephone
telephone carriers. Although the
development are impossible
impossible to reiterate here,
reasons underlying this development
the filed rate doctrine has been misapplied by the FCC to uphold the
supra note 17,
17, at 311-14;
INTELECOMMUNICATIONS
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
86. See Improving Network Reliability, supra
311-14; CRISIS IN
CARRIER LIABILITY,
supranote 17, at 14-28.
LIABILITY, supra
317, 322-23 (1921).
87. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Burke, 255 U.S. 317,322-23
(1921).
88. W. Union Tel. Co. v. Esteve Bros. &
& Co., 256 U.S.
U.S. 566, 574-75
574-75 (1921).
(1921).
89. Limitations of Liability in Connection
Connection with the Transmission
Transmission of Telegraph
Te1egraph Messages,
Messages, 61 I.C.C.
541,
550 (1921).
541,550
(1921).
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validity
validity of limitations of liability tariff provisions for telephone
90 As a result,
companies
telecommunications carriers).
companies (now called
called telecommunications
carriers).90
telecommunications
telecommunications carriers have been permitted to operate under a
legal
tariffs
legal regime
regime whereby
whereby services are rendered pursuant
pursuant to tariffs
containing
containing an absolute (and relatively low) limit of liability with no
choice
choice for customers to pay a higher rate for which full liability is an
91
option. 91
The significance
significance of this differential
differential evolution of liability regimes
for telecommunications
telecommunications (telephony) carriers relative
relative to other common
carriers
under
carriers is the corresponding
corresponding differential
differential effects of detariffing under
92
92
deregulatory
liability rules affect
deregulatory policies. Furthermore, given that liability
carriers'
economic
incentives
to
invest
in
performance
carriers'
incentives
performance of their
network systems, the differential
create differing
differential effects of detariffing create
implications
telecommunications carriers
implications for network performance
performance of telecommunications
relative to other common carriers:
The liability regime for telecommunications
telecommunications carriers
carriers is shifting
from one based on an absolute .limit on liability in tariffs to a
form of strict liability under the common law. By mandatorily
mandatorily
interexchange
detariffing interstate,
interexchange
telecommunications
services,
contributed to the acceleration
acceleration of this
services, the FCC has contributed
impacts
process but without adequate consideration of the likely impacts
on the achievability
achievability of other public policy
policy goals for the
telecommunications industry, such as universal service,
telecommunications
broadband deployment
deployment or homeland security. The federal
government's
changing-potentially
government's
inattention to the changing-potentially
catastrophic
levels
of-liabilities
telecommunications carriers
catastrophic
of-liabilities of telecommunications

313-16;

90. See Improving Network Reliability,
CRISIS IN
INTELECOMMUNICATIONS
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
Reliability, supra
supra note 17,
17, at 313-16; CRISIS
CARRIER LIABILITY,
LIABILITY, supra
supra note 17, at 34-35, 39-42.
91.
supranote
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
91. See Improving
Improving Network Reliability,
Reliability, supra
note 17, at 310-316; CRISIS
CRISIS IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS
CARRIER LIABILITY,
LIABILITY, supra
supra note 17, at 29-44.
CARRIER
92. See Improving
Improving Network Reliability,
supra note 17, at 310-17, 321-24; CRISIS
Reliability, supra
CRISIS IN
IN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS CARRIER LIABILITY,
LIABILITY, supra
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
supra note 17, at 39-42.

17, 34-35,39-42.
17, 29-44.

17, 310-316;

17,
310-17, 321-24;
17, 39-42.

Published by Reading Room, 2008
HeinOnline -- 24 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 971 2007-2008

25

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 4 [2008], Art. 2
972

STATE UNIVERSITY
UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
GEORGIA STATE

[Vol
[Vol. 24:4

under deregulatory policies stands in stark contrast to its
93
treatment of other common carriers and public utilities. 93

By contrast, the economic
economic ramifications of imposing detariffing
detariffing on
other common carriers
dramatic because an absolute limit
carriers were not as dramatic
on liability was never permitted
anomalously
permitted for such carriers as had anomalously
evolved for telephony carriers. In addition, notwithstanding
notwithstanding the
greater
transportation than
greater continuity in liability regimes for transportation
telecommunications
telecommunications carriers,
carriers, Congress
Congress mandated
mandated the Department
Department of
of
Transportation
(DOT)--but not the FCC-to study the impact of
of
Transportation (DOT}-but
deregulatory
released
deregulatory legislation
legislation on liability rules. DOT has thus far released
1998, exploring liability issues on an
two such studies, in 1995 and ~998,
94
and internationally.
intermodal
intermodal basis, both
both domestically
domestically and
internationally.94
The shift in the liability regime
telecommunications carriers
regime for telecommunications
carriers is
also of substantial
concern because
substantial concern
because carriers now confront potential
liability for catastrophic losses. As high risk, high reliability
organizations:
[T]he telecommunications
telecommunications system is characterized
characterized by such high
levels of interactive
interactive complexity and tight coupling [so] that
catastrophic potential are inevitable,
inevitable, or normal. In
accidents of catastrophic
economic terms, this means that it is impossible for a
telecommunications system to achieve one hundred per cent
telecommunications
reliability, regardless of how much the telecommunications
95
carrier spends on precautions or system improvements.95
circumstances, it may be necessary to impose an
Under these circumstances,
absolute limit on liability for the aggregate level of damages for
carrier would be liable to customers for a single event of
of
which a carrier
96
96
service interruption
service
interruption or outage. "A
"A limit on aggregate
aggregate liability would
uncertainty of catastrophic
protect carriers from the uncertainty
catastrophic levels of liability
93.
94.
95.
96.

See Improving
Improving Network Reliability,
supra note 17, at 309.
Reliability, supra
Id.
Id. at 323-24.
CRiSIS IN
LIABILITY, supra
See CRISIS
IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS
TELECOMMUNICATIONS CARRIER
CARRIER LIABILITY,
supra note 17, at 88.
Id.
Id.
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and thereby
of ubiquitous
thereby be more consistent with achievement
97
rates."
reasonable
at
service
of
availability service at reasonable rates.,,97
Although
of
Although the need for unique liability rules for technologies of
high-risk high-reliability
high-reliability organizations
organizations has been acknowledged
acknowledged in
other contexts-such
contexts-such as nuclear power plants-it
plants-it has thus far been
been
inadequately
States
inadequately considered
considered by policy making bodies in the United States
for application to communication
communication networks
under
deregulatory
networks
deregulatory
98 For this reason, the shift in the liability regime for
policies.98
telecommunications carriers
telecommunications
carriers poses a unique threat to the financial
viability of telecommunications
telecommunications carriers and to the long-term
sustainability, reliability, and ubiquity of communications
99 Furthermore,
infrastructures.
Furthermore, as previously discussed, adverse
infrastructures. 99
consequences
consequences for telecommunications
telecommunications networks will likely also affect
other critical infrastructures
infrastructures with which they interconnect.
interconnect.
CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION

Markets
Markets require an institutional
institutional framework, in which government
government
plays a critical role, to sustain them. Analogously, an institutional
framework is necessary for the sustainability of critical
infrastructures in modem
modern society. For utility infrastructures,
infrastructures, legal
infrastructures
principles
embedded
in
common
carriage
and
public utility law
principles embedded
carriage
evolved to ensure that essential public utility services were widely
reasonable rates, terms and conditions.
available under reasonable
Advances
communications technologies and shifts in reliance
Advances in communications
from monopoly to competitive market
market structures have dramatically
dramatically
the
complexity
designing
sustainable
of
sustainable
increased
complexity
telecommunications
deregulatory
telecommunications policies. The collective effect of deregulatory
telecommunications
policies--eliminating
telecommunications
policies-eliminating
or
eroding the
sustainability
sustainability of legal principles embedded in common carriage
97. See Improving
Improving Network Reliability,
17, at 328.
328.
Reliability, supra
supra note 17,
Reliability, supra
17, at 318-21;
CRISIS IN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
98. See Improving Network Reliability,
supra note 17,
318-21; CRISIS
IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS
CARRIER LIABILITY,
LIABILITY, supra
17, at 60-66.
CARRIER
supra note 17,
CRISIS IN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
99. See Improving
Improving Network Reliability,
Reliability, supra
supra note 17,
17, at 317-21;
317-21; CRISIS
IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS
CARRIER LIABILITY,
LIABILITY, supra
17, at 88-92.
88-92.
supra note 17,
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increasing political instability of explicitly
obligations, increasing
explicitly funded public
utility programs, and shifting
shifting the liability regime for the
telecommunications
telecommunications carriers from an absolute limit on liability to a
form of strict liability
liability under the common law-will adversely affect
the sustainability
sustainability of communications
communications (narrowband
(narrowband and broadband)
widespread
infrastructures with the emergent properties
properties of widespread
availability, affordability
reliability to which we have become
affordability and reliability
deregulatory policies
accustomed. Notably, the direct
direct effects
effects of deregulatory
implemented thus far for the telecommunications
telecommunications sector pose greater
implemented
problems
problems than those for the transportation
transportation sector. Unfortunately, the
consequences of deregulatory telecommunications
telecommunications policies will not
consequences
telecommunications sector but will also likely
likely
be contained to the telecommunications
cascade to other systems, institutions, and activities that the
communications infrastructures
communications
infrastructures underlie
underlie and to other critical
infrastructures-including
sectorsinfrastructures-including the transportation
transportation and electricity
electricity sectorscommunications (narrowband and broadband)
with which the communications
broadband)
infrastructures
infrastructures interconnect.
StatesUnfortunately, the network
network neutrality debate in the United Statestriggered by the FCC's elimination
elimination of important common law
principles for applicability
applicability to broadband-has
broadband-has mischaracterized
mischaracterized the
common carriage regime and its relationship
relationship to other bodies of law.
The radical nature by which fundamental
principles
fundamental common law principles
deregulatory
have been eliminated
eliminated under deregulatory
policies for
telecommunications as compared
compared to the transportation
transportation industries
telecommunications
remains unrecognized. Furthermore,
Furthermore, the distinctive means by which
consumer
sovereignty
has been pursued under general business
consumer
regimes as opposed to industry-specific
industry-specific regimes are also
underappreciated. As a result, there has been a preoccupation
preoccupation with
underappreciated.
affecting
the wholesale
regulatory policies
wholesale market and
unsubstantiated reliance
on
antitrust
principles
to address
address problems in
reliance
the retail market.
Further research is vital for improving our understanding
understanding of those
critical legal rules necessary for the sustainability of communications
communications
network infrastructures with the desired emergent
of
emergent properties of
widespread
widespread availability, affordability, and reliability. As research
research
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progresses, we
we may better
better understand
understand how
how the U.S.
U.S. common law
law
progresses,
principles
principles of
of common
common carriers
carriers and
and public
public utilities
utilities were
were an important
important
their
elimination
Furthermore,
fulfilling this function. Furthermore, their elimination
means of fulfilling
means
through deregulatory
deregulatory policies,
policies, but
but without
without replacement
replacement by
by some other
other
legal rules
rules to fulfill a similar function, may
may render
render unsustainable
unsustainable the
communications infrastructures
critical communications
infrastructures with the
development of critical
development
properties.
desired emergent
emergent properties.
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